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The goal of this MBA Project is to investigate possible disconnects between 
doctrine and practice in the employment of the Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(SUAV).  The Army’s current Small UAV requirements are based upon the Future 
Combat System’s Operations Requirements Document and has not been validated at the 
platoon or company level.  The Raven SUAV is a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) item 
that swiftly became the Army’s Small UAV of choice for operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Doctrine and Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) have been written for the 
Raven SUAV; however, it is not standard practice for all units operating the system 
abroad.  The last review of the SUAV operational requirements was conducted in 2003 
but did not specifically address its usage on the battlefield.  In an attempt to fill that gap, 
this project focuses on real-world usage of the Raven SUAV system. We compare 
doctrine versus practice using the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTML-PF) model 
as the primary logic construct. 
The report begins by providing a background of the Raven SUAV, to include its 
evolution from a COTS item to the Army’s SUAV of choice, and how it has impacted the 
warfighter.  Next, the authors provide an overview of DOTML-PF in order to provide a 
basis for comparing doctrine and practice. The study then looks in-depth at doctrine and 
practice using DOTML-PF as the model for revealing differences between the two.  
Finally, the authors analyze these differences and recommend solutions to mitigate 
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A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to study the Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(SUAV) and determine whether or not the system is owned, operated, and maintained in 
accordance with current doctrine.   
 
B.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  Background In the mid-1990s the Army realized that there was a need 
for a SUAV that could be used for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(RSTA) at the company and platoon level.  As years passed, the need for SUAVs 
continued to increase with forces deploying to engage in asymmetrical warfare.  The 
Army’s Special Operations community was the first to experiment with SUAVs as 
operations began to intensify in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Today, the Army and the Marine 
Light Infantry forces are also using SUAVs in Iraq.  The primary SUAV being used by 
the Army is the Raven which was a Commercial Item (CI) material solution to meet 
warfighter requirements.  
2.  Project Objectives This research project is specifically focused on the 
following primary research question: Are there differences between doctrine and practice 
with regard to Raven SUAV operations?   
The subsidiary research questions are: Is there an efficient and effective feedback 
loop for Raven SUAV lessons learned?  Are “real-world” lessons learned systematically 
incorporated into Raven SUAV doctrine?  How is PM-UAV/Army achieving leader buy-






C.  METHODOLOGY 
1. Conduct research to determine what requirements were written into the 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the 
SUAV and other documentation pertaining specifically to the Raven SUAV. 
2. Conduct research to determine the warfighter’s real-world requirements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and how they are operating the system. 
3. Review the FCS ORD and compare it with the current Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) of the ground forces. 
4. Review deployed unit SOPs to determine how they communicate lessons 
learned to higher headquarters. 
5. Conduct research to determine whether or not Raven SUAV lessons 
learned affect developing doctrine for the system. 
 
D.  FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The differences in Raven SUAV usage among deployed commanders form the 
dichotomies between doctrine and practice with regard to this system.  Using DOTML-
PF as a framework, we discovered that Doctrine is the component of DOTML-PF that 
has the most dichotomies when comparing “Doctrine” to “Practice” in Raven SUAV 
operations.  There are missions listed in the Raven TTP Manual that are executed as 
written and others that are modified to meet the commander’s operational needs. 
Furthermore, commanders are using the system to conduct missions that are not written 
in the Raven TTP Manual, but are of value and continue to preserve lives and increase 
unit effectiveness. 
These differences, which many key leaders have deemed the “commander’s 
innovativeness,” brings to focus whether there is an efficient and effective feedback loop 
for lessons learned.  The feedback loop for the Raven SUAV remains a work-in-progress 
as a result of its newness to the Army community.  The current process for getting 
feedback information from the field is executed in two ways.  In some cases an 
Operational Assessment (OA) team will travel to theater to collect information, and then 
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report it to the Department of the Army and TRADOC.  On other occasions, a Center or 
School House will do an independent survey either during or after a rotation by a certain 
unit.  Usually those surveys are After Action Reports (AAR) conducted shortly after a 
unit has returned.   
The bottom line is that because dichotomies exist between doctrine and practice in 
Raven SUAV usage, it is imperative that units capture the good and the bad while 
operating the system.  The mechanism for relaying this critical information from the field 
must be made standard and checks must be conducted to ensure that the information is 
put into doctrine for follow-on units to execute.  
 
E.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Decision makers need to establish one standard mechanism for reporting 
Raven SUAV lessons learned for incorporation into evolving doctrine.  Capturing how 
units employ the system is perishable feedback loop data that must be effectively and 
efficiently disseminated.  
2. The Infantry Center Directorate of Combat Development (DCD) is doing 
an excellent documenting how the Raven SUAV is being employed.  They have traveled 
to Iraq to ensure that the procedures for how the Raven employment are being annotated 
and put into appropriate documentation.  The Infantry Center DCD personnel need to 
ensure these lessons learned are used for developing future requirements and refining 
current TTPs as it is disseminated through established feedback mechanisms.  
3. Leader buy-in to the Raven SUAV was recognized early by the Project 
Manager‘s office as being one of the most important issues for the success of the Raven 
system.  The PM office’s primary venue for gaining leader buy-in is the New Material 
Introductory Brief (NMIB).  This briefing informs the leadership of the Raven SUAV 
capabilities and limitations. The PM Office should continue educating commanders at all 
levels to ensure they are fully aware of the Raven SUAV and how much of a combat-














































I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this report is to study the Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(SUAV) and determine whether or not the system is owned, operated and maintained 
according to doctrine. To accomplish this we analyze the Raven’s Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures Manual, Operator’s Manual, and the Small UAV Operational 
Requirements Document.  This analysis was then compared to lessons learned from units 
operating the Raven SUAV in Afghanistan and Iraq to exploit any gaps in information 
flow between the user and the agency writing the Raven SUAV doctrine. Figure 1 depicts 
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B. BACKGROUND  
In the mid 1990s the Army realized there was a need for a SUAV that could be 
used for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) at the company 
and platoon level.  The initial look was to sponsor a Micro Air Vehicle Advanced 
Conceptual Technical Demonstration (MAV ACTD) to display the capabilities and 
benefits of having a UAV at these levels.  The MAV ACTD was divided into three areas 
of responsibility.  [Ref. 1] 
The three areas of responsibility were, The Technical Manager, the Operational 
Manager, and the Transition Manager.  The Technical manager was responsible for 
overall program management and delivery of the MAV system.  The Operational 
Manager was the United States Army Pacific Command, Deputy Chef of Staff for 
Intelligence (USARPAC, G2/DCSINT).  He was responsible to develop the 
requirements, plan and execute the experimentation, and conduct the Military Utility 
Assessment of the MAV System.  The Transition Manager was the Project Manager for 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and was responsible for the transition of the MAV system 
into current and/or future force.  The MAV ACTD had many ups and downs due to poor 
planning and management.  There is now new leadership and they have reenergized the 
program.   
The need for SUAVs grew with forces deployed into Afghanistan and 
subsequently Iraq.  The initial users of SUAVs were the Special Operations Forces and 
the Rangers in the mountains of Afghanistan.  Today, the Army and the Marine Light 
Infantry forces are also using SUAVs in Iraq.  The primary SUAV being used by the 
Army is the Raven which was a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) material solution to 
meet warfighter requirements.  The Army is on board to purchase an additional 250 
systems in fiscal year 2005, and the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) has 
convened to award a contract to meet the requirements of the Joint Requirement 
Oversight Council (JROC)-Approved Capabilities Development Document (CDD). 
The issue concerns the supportability and the maintainability of the SUAV at 
levels below battalion.  Chapter II provides background information for the Raven 
SUAV.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This research project is specifically focused upon the following primary research 
question:  
• Are there differences between doctrine and practice with regard to Raven 
SUAV operations?   
The subsidiary research questions are:  
• Is there an efficient and effective feedback loop for Raven SUAV lessons 
learned? 
• Are “real-world” lessons learned systematically incorporated into Raven 
SUAV doctrine? 
• How is PM-UAV/Army achieving leader buy-in for the Raven SUAV?   
 
D. SCOPE  
The scope of this report is limited to the Raven SUAV Doctrine versus Practice 
and how it relates to DOTLM-PF.  The literature that supports this study includes defense 
planning rules and policies, Army Objective Force concept and requirements 
documentation, Future Combat Systems Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 
Rucksack Portable ORD, SUAV ORD, slides from JROC and industry briefings, as well 
as various defense publication articles regarding SUAVs.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY  
Compare and contrast differences between how current Army documentation 
theorizes units should own, operate, and maintain their SUAV fleet versus how units in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are actually conducting operations.  DOTLM-PF is the analytical 
mechanism used for conducting this comparison.  
(1) Conduct research to determine what requirements were written into the 
FCS ORD for the SUAV and other documentation pertaining specifically to the Raven 
SUAV. 
(2) Conduct research to determine the warfighter’s real-world requirements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and how they are operating the system.  
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(3) Review the FCS ORD and compare it with the current Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) of the ground forces. 
Identify whether or not there is a feedback loop or some other mechanism of 
ensuring lessons learned are incorporated into developing Raven doctrine and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP).  
(1) Review deployed unit SOPs to determine how they communicate lessons 
learned to higher headquarters. 
(2) Conduct research to determine whether or not Raven SUAV lessons 
learned affect developing doctrine for the system. 
 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
Chapter I:  Introduction.  Identifies the focus and purpose of this project as well as 
the primary and subsidiary research questions.  
Chapter II: Background.  Provides a basic overview of the Raven SUAV.  
Chapter III: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, 
Facilities (DOTML-PF) Overview.  
Chapter IV: Raven SUAV requirements in “Doctrine” 
Chapter V: Raven SUAV requirements in “Practice” 
Chapter VI: Analysis of Doctrine versus Practice 
Chapter VII: Findings and Recommendations.  Summarizes the findings of the 
research, answers the research questions, and identifies questions for further study.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the Raven 
SUAV currently being used by the United States Army in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This 
chapter includes information on the origins of the Raven, its developmental history, and 
its current usage and status.  The chapter concludes by describing the Army’s specific 
acquisition strategy for the system. 
 
B. THE RAVEN SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (SUAV) 
The Raven SUAV depicted in Figures 1 and 2 is a hand-launched SUAV that 
provides beyond line-of-site (LOS) reconnaissance and surveillance.  The system 
transmits live video images and compass headings (location information) to a ground 
control unit (GCU) and remote video terminal (RVT), enabling operators to navigate, 
search for targets, recognize terrain, and records all information for later analysis. [Ref.2] 




Figure 2.   Raven SUAV [Ref. 3] 













Wingspan 55 inches 
Length 36 inches 
Structure modular, Kevlar™ composite  
Weight (with payload) 4.0 lbs 
Payload Nose Weight 6.5 oz 
Operating Altitude 150 to 1000 ft AGL 
Nominal Low Altitude 100 ft 
Cruise Speed 30 mph (13.5 m/s) 
Range 10 km (LOS) 
Climb Rate 900 ft/min @ 2000 ft AGL 
Turn Rate (360º) 25 seconds 
Motor direct drive electric 
Aircraft Batteries LiSO2 (single-use) Li-Ion (rechargeable) 
Flight Duration  90 + min rechargeable  90 + min single-use 
Launch hand 
Landing commanded autoland deep stall 
Navigation P(y)-code GPS and electronic compass 
Flight Control manual or autonomous 






EO Camera Payload Nose – Front & Side Look 1 
IR Camera Payload Nose –Front Look 1 
IR Camera Payload Nose –Side Look 1 
GCU 1 
Remote Video Terminal 0-1 
Table 2.   System Components [Ref. 2] 
 
On 08 January 2003, the Army UAV Program Office briefed the Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army (VCSA) on the SUAV Requirements to support units deployed 
primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Following the briefing, the VCSA stated, “I don’t 
want to wait 20 years for a platoon UAV.” [Ref. 4] Less than 3 weeks later, on 21 
January 2003, the VCSA and the Army G3 approved the 101st Airborne Division for a 
rapid acquisition and equipping/fielding of the Raven SUAV in conjunction with the 
Rapid Equipping Force initiatives.  On 16 May 2003, the Army UAV Program Office 
received $1.9M in funding and signed a letter contract for five Raven SUAV systems 
with options for future procurements as funding become available.  
By September 2003, the Raven SUAV had achieved many successes during 
Operations ENDURING FREEDON and IRAQI FREEDOM and was designated as an 
Urgent Wartime Requirement by the Army G3.  The Deputy Secretary of Defense 
directed the procurement of 185 Raven SUAVs within thirty days of the G3’s 
designation.  These systems were issued to combat arms units both in garrison preparing 
for deployment, and abroad already engaged in the war on terrorism.  
 
C. RAVEN SUAV MISSIONS 
Raven Teams may perform missions as an independent element (surveillance, 
reconnaissance, Forward Operating Base (FOB) security) or they may act as a 
subordinate element supporting a larger operation (convoy security, assault, cordon and 
search).  Raven Teams must be prepared to conduct mission planning and pre-mission 
coordination when employed in either role. [Ref. 5] 
 12
The Raven SUAV is currently owned, operated, and maintained at the company 
level.  The extensive planning involved in coordinating and conducting its missions 
coupled with the logistical effort necessary to maintain the equipment, have caused key 
Army leaders to hypothesize whether or not it is feasible to execute Raven missions 
below the battalion level.   
 
D. RAVEN SUAV ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The Army has a specific acquisition strategy based on requirements and funding. 
The Raven SUAV is the anomaly because it did not follow the traditional acquisition 
lifecycle process.  On 2 January 2004, AeroVironment Corporation was awarded a 
$20,700,000 firm-fixed-price/cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for procurement of 170 Raven 
SUAVs.  Work was performed in Simi Valley, California, and was completed by 31 
December 2004. [Ref. 6] Shortly after production of these systems, units owned, 
operated, and maintained the Raven SUAV before it underwent the phases of the 
Acquisition Product Lifecycle.  The plan through December 2005 is to continue to equip 
Army units with the system and compete it in the solicitation phase in hopes of meeting 
the Army Class I UAV requirement for Future Combat Systems (FCS).  
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the evolution of the Raven SUAV from its original 
inception to its current state.  Although the Raven has not developed through the 
Acquisition Product Lifecycle Process it has been the surveillance aircraft of choice for 
lower-level Army units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq since the onset of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Chapter III will provide an overview of 
the Army’s concept of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, 
and Facilities (DOTML-PF) which will be the basis from which we examine the 




III. DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, MATERIAL, 
LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, FACILITIES (DOTML-PF) 
OVERVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of DOTML-PF which is the 
model the authors use to evaluate the feasibility of owning, operating, and maintaining 
the Raven SUAV below the battalion level.  DOTML-PF is a very useful tool for looking 
at a large issue or set of issues, operation(s), or business area and breaking it apart into 
more discrete, manageable sets of tasks and deliverables. [Ref. 7]  This chapter defines 
and discusses each component of DOTML-PF in order to set the stage for comparing 
theory versus doctrine for operating the RAVEN SUAV in chapters IV and V 
respectively. 
1. Doctrine 
Doctrine products include doctrine publications, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, (TTP), operating procedures, regulations, checklists, or policy which governs 
or guides the way the military conducts business. [Ref. 7] 
2. Organization 
Organization products and services include actual organizations needed to 
conduct an operation or business, the visual representation of those organizations, 
organizational characteristics, and opportunities and challenges in utilizing them to 
perform an operation or conduct business. [Ref. 7] 
3. Training 
Training products and services encompass training content and all methods of 
delivering that content to its intended audience which enables performance and support of 
the mission. [Ref. 7] 
4. Material 
Material products are traditionally what have been associated with the defense 
acquisition process to include weapons, platforms, communication equipment, medical 
equipment, transportation, and training software.  It is important to remember that even  
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though materiel may be used to directly perform a mission, it may also support another 
DOTML-PF component that supports the mission, especially facilities and training. [Ref. 
7] 
5. Leadership 
The leadership aspect of DOTML-PF deals with the management and 
implementation of change across the DOTML-PF spectrum. [Ref. 7] 
6. Personnel 
The personnel component of DOTML-PF is primarily to ensure that qualified 
personnel are there to support a capability.  This includes identification of the knowledge, 
skills, abilities, and competencies needed to perform a position, job or task.  It may 
involve creation of new occupational specialties to support new missions, threats, and 
technologies and revision of those specialties over a period of time. [Ref. 7] 
7. Facilities 
Facilities products and services include supplies, engineering support, and much 
of what is currently associated with logistics. [Ref. 7]   
 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter defined each component of DOTML-PF from a requirements 
perspective as it pertains to analyzing and solving issues within the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  The DoD’s understanding of this concept is still evolving as the two 
most difficult areas to describe in a requirements context are organization and leadership.  
This concept is DOTML-PF is a valuable analytical tool that can be used to develop 
requirements and solutions to military problems.  Rarely is looking at one component of 
DOTML-PF sufficient for developing a solution to a requirement.  Even though program 
dollars are tied to the material component of DOTML-PF, requirements for other areas 





IV. RAVEN SUAV REQUIREMENTS IN “DOCTRINE” 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the doctrine for the Army’s Raven 
Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV) requirements as they relate to the DOTLM-PF.  
These requirements were initially developed at the beginning of 2001 in a draft version of 
the SUAV Operational Requirements Document (ORD).  This ORD was never finalized 
or approved; however, it underwent staffing through the core members of the UAV 
Integrated Concept Team (ICT).  The core members consisted of the Army Aviation 
Directorate of Combat Development (DCD), the Infantry Center DCD, the Military 
Intelligence Center DCD, and the Armor Center DCD.  The requirements listed in the 
SUAV ORD became the framework for the Class I UAV requirements that are written 
into the current Future Combat System (FCS) ORD.   
Although staffed through a vigorous IPT process, these requirements do not fully 
represent what the warfighters are doing in theater.  There is a real-world requirement for 
a SUAV that was sorely needed in Iraq and Afghanistan to combat insurgents.  Since 
there was no military system available, the Army selected a Commercial Off the Shelf 
(COTS) version of a SUAV.  This version was the Raven and is produced by 
AeroVironment located in San Diego, CA.  This is the SUAV that the majority of the 
Army is using in Iraq today.   
1. Doctrine 
Doctrine products include doctrine publications; Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, (TTP); operating procedures, regulations and checklists, which guides the 
way the military conducts business.  The doctrine we analyzed is derived from the 
documentation supporting the Raven SUAV.  The user manual and the TTPs are 
currently the only documentation available to support the deployed Raven SUAV.   
The Raven SUAV improves situational awareness at company level and below.  
These systems, used for company and platoon reconnaissance on the ground, are critical 
to the maneuver company commander’s decision-making process.  Aviation, combat 
support, and combat service support units benefit from the improved situational 
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awareness (SA) and associated force protection provided by the Raven.  The use of the 
Raven provides commanders with real-time, beyond-line-of-sight SA and the ability to 
detect, identify, and/or avoid enemy units or areas of threat by providing sensor-based 
information.  By using the Raven, a greater standoff capability is created which gives 
units greater success and reduces the risk of putting soldiers into dangerous situations.  
By doing this, leaders are able to make decisions faster and with greater precision. 
The Raven SUAV has documentation to support its operation and has current 
TTPs.  The TTPs are being verified in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Army and Marine 
Corps.  The TTP’s were written by the Infantry Center DCD and dated June 30, 2004.  
They received information from the field and were able to accurately document these 
procedures for future reference.  These TTPs are being continuously updated and their 
refinement will not be complete until more data is received from the field.   This is a 
prime area for future research. 
The Raven is a system that was directly purchased from the contractor and 
provides an eye-in-the-sky for the ground commander.  The reason for the COTS 
purchase is because there was nothing available in the Army’s inventory to support this 
doctrinal requirement.   
The primary users of the Raven system are soldiers at the Company and Platoon 
level.  They would use these systems to gather real-time surveillance and for force 
protection.  The system could have a secondary use of providing various security 
missions.  They would range from convoy security to runway and airfield security.  
2. Organization 
The Raven SUAV will primarily be used below company level and will be 
divided within the platoons.  One soldier is required to operate and maintain the Raven.  
There are certain components of the system that will require higher level maintenance 
support.    
3. Training 
Training will be conducted at the unit level; however, the methodology for 
training is not written.  The draft Raven SUAV training log contained in Appendix F of 
the Raven Manual v.2. Training on these systems will be conducted initially at Advanced 
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Individual Training and at the Officer Basic Course.  All leaders must understand 
Raven’s capabilities in order to employ them to their full potential.  The Infantry Center 
Directorate of Combat development will visit units to provide Key Leaders a New 
Materiel Introductory Brief (NMIB).  The purpose is to educate the leadership on the 
benefits and value of using the Raven.    
As with any other weapon system, there must be a training plan in place that 
document when and how the training is conducted.  There must be a task, condition, and 
standard for the Raven and all operators must be capable of accomplishing these tasks.  In 
order to accomplish the training there must be spares calculated into the total number of 
systems needed.  The planned amount is 10% of the total Table of Organization and 
Equipment (TOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) systems 
requirements.  Table 3 depicts the breakout of the total Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
System Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). 
 
TOE Sub-Total Total 
BCT 1150 Systems 1150 
Supporting Brigades 1116 Systems 2266 
TDA   
TRADOC Schools 17 Systems 2283 
USSOCOM   
All Organizations 348 Systems 2631 
Spares   
10%  263 Systems 2894 
   
  TOTAL REQUIREMENT  2894 Systems 
Table 3.   Raven SUAV Breakout [Ref. 8] 
 
Training teams will be established to train and educate the operators.  There will 
also be training provided to the leadership within the command to ensure they properly 
understand how to employ the Raven.  In order to properly employ the Raven SUAV the 
leadership must fully understand its capabilities.  Currently, there are no means to gather 
information   on   whether or not the training is measured and monitored accurately.   
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Another issue is that the training is neither sufficiently staffed nor funded.  The Raven 
operator does not have a skill identifier so there is no dedicated MOS assigned to operate 
the SUAV.   
4. Material 
The material solution for the Army’s UAV requirement came in the form of a 
Commercial Item (CI).  Below are the funds available for the Army UAV programs as 
compared to the other services.  It was originally thought that there would be more 
funding available as a result of the war in Iraq.   
U.S. Department of Defense UAVS Service Budgets
(FY05 PB%) (RDTE, Procurement, OMA)
8  
Figure 4.   DoD UAV Service Budgets [Ref. 8] 
 
The Raven was originally scheduled to have $58.5 Million for procurement. From 
September of 2003 through October of 2004 the Army procured 185 Systems.  This was 
due to VCSA and the Army G3 approving request by the 101st Airborne Division for a 
rapid acquisition and equipping/fielding of a SUAV.  This was in accordance with the 
Rapid Equipping Force Initiatives which had $2.4 million already allocated.  In May 
2003 the Army received $1.9 million and signed a letter contract for five Raven Systems 
with options for future procurement.  These systems arrived in October 2003 and training 
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and maintenance support began.  On 16 October 2003 the Secretary of Defense directed 
procurement of the 185 Raven systems.  The cost will probably go up due to the great 
success of this system in Iraq.  
U.S. Department of Defense UAVS Service Budgets
(FY05 PB $M) (RDTE, Procurement, OMA)
9  




The leadership aspect of DOTML-PF deals with managing and implementing 
change across the DOTML-PF spectrum.  There are different levels of leadership that are 
affected within the Raven System.  The lowest level is the operator and is found at the 
platoon level.  The operator is responsible for the maintenance, operation, and care of the 
Raven.  The missions flown are dictated by the command, based upon intelligence reports 
disseminated throughout the organization.  The training program brings in the leadership 
to ensure that they understand how to properly employ the Raven system.  In some cases, 
the leadership has not “bought into” the value of the Raven System and therefore the 
system is not being utilized to its full potential.   
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The Infantry Center Directorate of Combat Development is trying to educate the 
leadership within the combat Divisions by conducting New Materiel Introductory Briefs 
(NMIB).  This will help mitigate Raven SUAV leadership training shortfalls and educate 
them on the advantages of the system.   
6. Personnel 
The personnel component of DOTML-PF is primarily to ensure that qualified 
personnel are available to support a capability.  This includes identification of the 
knowledge, skills, abilities, and competencies needed to perform a position, job, or task.  
It may involve creation of new occupational specialties to support new missions, threats, 
and technologies and include revision of those specialties over a period of time.  
New training programs will be needed to fully support the Raven UAV.  Since 
Raven was not a typical Army acquisition, there was not a valid plan to support Raven 
system maintainability. The personnel are currently training prior to deployment. Trainer 
teams are also going to units already deployed to train replacement personnel and update 
the TTPs.  The primary user will also conduct the majority of maintenance and support.  
This maintenance will be limited and will be easy to do. This significantly reduces the 
burden on the operator.  Major repairs will be at depot level, and the Air Vehicle will be 
changed out on a one–for-one basis.   
7. Facilities 
There are no actual facilities required to operate the Raven system.  The only 
issue unique to the UAV community is the ability to acquire the airspace needed to fly 
the Raven.  The Raven poses a potential risk to manned aviation assets and other 
unmanned aerial vehicles on the battlefield.    
 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined each component of DOTML-PF in doctrine from a 
requirements perspective as it pertains to Raven System.  The Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities were examined based on the 
current information available.  Since the Raven is a fairly new system this information 
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and the way the Army conducts operations in regards to the Raven are in their infancy 
stage.  
All areas of DOTML-PF are important but we believe that the Doctrine is one of 
the most important.  Until the doctrine is thoroughly evaluated, the Army will not know if 
it is written correctly.  The TTPs are being evaluated on a daily basis in Iraq by the users.  
The key link between the user and Doctrine developers continues to evolve.   As each 
unit employs the Raven, they will find better ways to use it, from a surveillance vehicle to 
a noise producer to entice enemy out of hiding.  This information needs to be 
documented, organized and captured so it can better train the warfighter in the future.   
The doctrinal support for the Raven is still undergoing revisions based upon the 
information received from the field.  That information is valuable and will change the 
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V. SMALL UAV (SUAV) REQUIREMENTS IN “PRACTICE” 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the “practice” portion of how Small 
UAVs are being operated and maintained by providing an in-depth view from a Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTML-PF)  
perspective.  DOTML-PF is an effective tool for investigating and gathering all the 
pertinent data needed to draw conclusions in order to formulate a complete, relevant, and 
correct set of requirements for solving operational issues and deficiencies. [Ref. 7]  In 
this chapter DOTML-PF is the framework we use to understand how the Raven SUAV 
has been employed.   
The majority of the data in this chapter was gathered through an Independent User 
Assessment (IUA) of the Raven SUAV conducted by the Electronics and Special 
Developments Division (ESDD) of the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD).  
The user assessment focused upon the training, employment, and overall operations of 
the system in a combat environment through the conduct of operational employment 
interviews with Raven operators and their Chain of Command.  This chapter uses each 
component of DOTML-PF to evaluate how units are operating and maintaining the 
Raven SUAV from a real-world perspective.  Chapters IV and V form the basis for 
comparing the “doctrine” versus “practice” of Raven SUAV operations that will be 
discussed in Chapter VI.  
1. Doctrine 
The IUA revealed that the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (TTP) for 
operating the Raven SUAV varies between units deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Operations range from reconnaissance missions to perimeter and convoy security, 
spanning across all spectrums of the battlefield.  The two most common uses of the 
Raven SUAV are to (a) conduct reconnaissance missions to develop target books for 
future operations and (b) assist convoys with identifying Improvised Explosive Devices  
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(IED), potential ambushes, and alternate avenues to travel when traffic is congested along 
a specified route.  These uses provide the Blue Forces (BLUFOR) Commander with real-
time eyes on the enemy. 
The Raven SUAV is also used in a dual role with the larger Shadow UAV.  In this 
scenario both UAVs are used in a layered effect by looking deep with Shadow and close-
in with Raven system.  The Shadow operates from roughly 0500 hrs to 2300 hrs daily 
with the Raven being used when cued by Shadow or manned assets.  The Raven performs 
perimeter and convoy security, assaults, raids, and Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) 
missions. [Ref. 9]   
The Raven’s dual role with the Shadow extends beyond looking at the deep and 
close fight.  These systems are also used to facilitate command and control of the 
battlefield.  The UAVs monitor enemy movement and positions and relay that 
information to the maneuver units on the battlefield.  The Raven’s size and swiftness 
allows it to look over walls and onto rooftops, identify enemy positions, and maneuver to 
positions of advantage.  All of these uses give the commander an advantage before and 
during combat engagements.     
2. Organization 
The Raven SUAV is currently owned, operated, and maintained at four different 
levels within the Army that range from brigade to platoon.  Since the 
mission/management focus is different at each level, the use of the Raven SUAV varies 
accordingly.  The IUA revealed the Raven SUAV is most effectively used at the Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) level.              
3. Training 
The concept of operations for Raven SUAV training is divided into two phases 
and is conducted both in CONUS and OCONUS.  Phase I operator training is conducted 
at Camp Udairi, Kuwait; Huntsville, Alabama; and Fort Benning, Georgia.  This training 
consists of an 8-to-10 day program of instruction focused upon training soldiers on how 
to operate the system.  The instructor to student ratio is 1:4 with a primary instructor and 
2:8 with the addition of an assistant instructor.  Students are given classroom instruction 
covering a wide variety of topics from characteristics and capabilities, airspace and 
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frequency management, and mission planning.  The bulk of the training, however, 
consists of hands-on flying of the Air Vehicles (AV) during both day and night.  Flight 
training is conducted from day one through the final day of the course.  Each day the 
students are rotated to increasingly difficult situations such as complex terrain and mobile 
operations (HMMWV). [Ref. 9]  Phase II collective training is when operational training 
personnel deploy to unit sites to train command and staff elements on the Raven SUAV 
System.  Additionally these operational personnel deploy with units to help establish 
CONOPS and TTPs. 
4. Material 
Thirteen small UAV prototypes were examined for the Army use.  Of those 
thirteen, the top three were the Rucksack Portable UAV (RPUAV), the Micro Air 
Vehicle (MAV), and the United States Marine Corps’ Small Unit Remote Scouting 
System (SURSS)/Dragon Eye.  The Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System 
(PM-UAVS) conducted a comparison of the Raven SUAV and the Dragon Eye and 
discovered that the Raven was better suited for the Army’s SUAV needs. [Ref. 10]  
While there are other SUAV systems operated by Marine Corps and Navy elements, the 
Raven SUAV remains the system of choice for Army units deployed in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.    
5. Leadership 
The most common observance by the IUA Team concerning units operating the 
Raven SUAV is that the leadership at all levels remains unaware of the Raven’s 
capabilities and is therefore somewhat reluctant to employ the system.  Furthermore, unit 
leadership is generally uninformed about the tactical capabilities the Raven SUAVS can 
provide.  As a result, the system has an almost non-existent role in unit operations.   
Despite the overall lack of knowledge, there are many success stories.  One in 
particular is that of MAJ Chlebowski of 1-6 FA.  He said, “The Raven is the best piece of 
equipment out here.  We couldn’t have killed as many enemy forces as we have, and 





Soldiers operating the Raven SUAV in Afghanistan and Iraq are removed from 
their assigned military specialty to operate the system.  These soldiers are generally 
assessed as qualified to conduct Raven SUAV operations after an 8-to-10 day program of 
instruction.  Soldiers operating the Raven SUAV must be mature and responsible, possess 
strong map-reading skills, and must be capable of working with battalion/company 
commanders and their associated staffs.  Although there is no formal occupational 
specialty for Raven SUAV operators, the advisability of creating one is being discussed.  
7. Facilities 
There are adequate facilities in both Afghanistan and Iraq to maintain the Raven 
SUAV system.  Repairs are conducted at a Logistics Support Center (LSC) managed by a 
Logistical Support Contractor (LSC) assigned to PM-UAVS.  The LSC coordinates pick-
up and return of the damaged equipment with the unit and either personally delivers the 
parts, has the unit pick them up from his facility, or sends them via cargo to the unit’s 
Forward Operating Base (FOB).  Repairs are rarely conducted at the unit-level as there 
are no trained UAV maintainers below Depot level.   
 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the “practice” portion of how Small UAVs are actually 
operated and maintained by providing an in-depth view from a DOTML-PF perspective.  
Knowledgeable users feel the Raven SUAVS significantly contributes to the ongoing war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and that it is a proven combat multiplier.  The Raven SUAV 
directly and significantly contributes to fewer casualties.   
There is a huge difference between how units employ the Raven SUAVS.  Some 
units are extremely proficient with the system and have fully integrated it into their 
scheme of maneuver.  Other units barely use the Raven and apparently do not understand 
the capabilities it can bring to the fight.  Soldiers are finding new and creative ways to 
employ the Raven and share its information with leaders.  Leaders that are responsive to 
the soldier’s ideas are finding that the Raven has become an invaluable asset. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINE VERSUS PRACTICE  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a discussion and analysis of how the Raven Small UAV 
(SUAV) is supposed to be operated and maintained according to “doctrine” as compared 
to how the system is actually operated and maintained in “practice.”  The Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTML-PF) model is the framework used to conduct the comparison and 
provide in-depth analysis for each DOTML-PF component.   
First, a brief overview of critical points in Chapter IV and V will be provided.  
Then, the focus will shift to comparing and contrasting those two chapters to form a 
conclusion and recommendations which will be provided in Chapter VII.  The two 
primary issues addressed in this chapter are: 1) The Feedback Loop for lessons learned in 
the field to key decisions makers in garrison, and 2) What is the best way to gain key 
leader buy-in for the Raven SUAV?  These issues were derived based on feedback from 
two experienced Naval Postgraduate School Faculty members.   
 
B. DOCTRINE ANALYSIS 
Analyzing DOTML-PF in doctrine from a requirements perspective as it pertains 
to the Raven System was a challenging and eye-opening experience.  The Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities were examined 
based upon the current information available.  Since the Raven is a fairly new system, 
this information and the way the Army conducts operations with regard to the Raven is in 
its infancy stage.  
Existing written doctrine for the Raven system consists of both a Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) manual developed at the United States Army Infantry 
Center and the Raven Operator’s Manual.  The Raven manual was developed by the 
manufacturer and does not include any detailed TTPs.  This manual serves as an owner’s 
manual rather than a doctrinal guide for employment.  As combat operations in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq continue, the Infantry Center will continue to collect data and refine 
doctrinal manuals for the Raven SUAV.  Until the doctrine is thoroughly evaluated, the 
Army will not know if it is written correctly.  The TTPs are being evaluated on a daily 
basis by the Raven users in Iraq.   
The key link between the user and Doctrine developers continues to evolve.   As 
each unit employs the Raven, they will find better ways to use it, ranging from a 
surveillance vehicle to a noise producer to entice the enemy out of hiding.  This 
information needs to be documented, organized, and captured so it can be disseminated to 
better train the warfighter in the future.   The doctrinal support for the Raven is still 
undergoing revisions based upon the information received from the field.  That 
information is valuable and will change the current doctrine of how we look at UAV 
requirements in support of DOTLM-PF.  
  
C. PRACTICE ANALYSIS 
The Raven SUAV has undergone a tremendous evolution as it has become the 
Army’s SUAV of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Since the Raven SUAV was initially 
acquired as a Commercial Item, much of its use by deployed units has become the 
standard by which other units operate this system.  Although there are existing Raven 
SUAV manuals and Tactics Technique and Procedures (TTP), units operating the Raven 
are finding creative ways to employ the system, thus making it a more diversified asset 
for maneuver commanders. 
In addition to the maneuver commanders, the Raven SUAV is swiftly winning the 
confidence of the leadership throughout the Army.  COLONEL John Burke, Project 
Manager for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, stated in Army Magazine, "I really believe that 
the infusion of the small UAV into the Army is every bit as transformational as night 
vision goggles were.  We're giving those tactical commanders something just as 
significant as night vision goggles, because we're opening up a whole new dimension of 
combat operations."  
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The new dimension of combat operations COLONEL John Burke spoke about is 
approached differently among maneuver commanders.  COLONEL Burke added, “If a 
commander is in urban operations, he's going to use it for urban ops.  If a commander is 
out at a firebase, he's going to use it for firebase security.  He's going to use that system to 
plug a gap that he needs some kind of surveillance over.  What we find is that every 
commander will use it differently because they have different missions, different terrain, 
different populations, and different competencies.  The point is that the commander is 
going to use it to the limits of his creativity in the context of his environment and his 
mission.” 
These differences in Raven SUAV usage form the dichotomies among doctrine 
and practice with regard to the system.  Section D of this chapter provides analysis on 
each component of DOTML-PF comparing doctrine to practice in order to highlight 
potential dichotomies.   
 
D. DOTML-PF COMPARISON 
1. Doctrine 
Doctrine is the component of DOTML-PF that is most significant when 
comparing “Doctrine” to “Practice” regarding Raven SUAV operations.  Doctrinal uses 
of the Raven SUAV listed in the Raven Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) 
Manual dated 26 June 2004 are: 
 
   1.) Using Raven to draw out enemy forces. 
   2.) Conducting Convoy Security missions. 
   3.) Conducting Counter-Mortar Quick Reaction Force Operations. 
   4.) Conducting Air-Ground Teaming Missions. 
    5.) Conducting Area Reconnaissance missions. 
Units operating the Raven SUAV in Afghanistan and Iraq conduct most of the 
doctrinal missions listed in the Raven TTP Manual, but with differences in execution.  
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These units also use the Raven SUAV for missions not listed in the Raven TTP manual. 
These additional missions are highlighted later in this chapter. 
Using the Raven SUAV to draw out enemy forces is a mission not conducted by 
forces operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This particular mission uses the Raven to 
determine enemy positions or differentiate combatants from non-combatants. According 
to the TTP manual, units fly the Raven SUAV over the selected enemy positions 
repeatedly at low altitude and high speed in an attempt to attract the attention of enemy 
forces.  Once in the open, an established Sniper Team or Armed Aircraft destroys the 
enemy troops.  This mission is purely doctrinal in nature and is not reflected in the known 
“practices” of deployed units. 
When employed in a Convoy Security role, the Raven SUAV can be used to 
search for suspicious activity, scout ahead to positively identify turn points, locate 
potential choke points, and maintain integrity of the convoy, etc. [Ref. 5]  The Raven 
SUAV TTP Manual does not provide specifics with regard to executing the Convoy 
Security mission; however, it does caution Raven SUAV operators to check for 
obstructions in flight path (overpasses, wires, signs, roadside vegetation, oncoming 
traffic, etc.) prior to launching the mission. 
Units operating the Raven SUAV in Afghanistan and Iraq use the system on a 
daily basis to conduct Convoy Security missions.  One unit briefed that the unit’s Ravens 
are normally employed by the maneuver company, but that in some cases it is employed 
to protect the logistics supply trains.  In this particular unit, the Raven SUAV’s popularity 
presented asset allocation issues in that it was the only asset providing situational 
awareness to maneuver commanders, while the unit’s support assets also required its 
usage for convoy security during logistics support missions. Unit commanders 
confronting these type issues quickly realized how important the Raven SUAV was to all 
facets of combat operations. 
According to the Raven SUAV TTP Manual, the system is also used to conduct 
Counter-Mortar Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Operations.  If mortar activity is suspected 
or detected, the Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ) is immediately activated.  A Raven 
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team acts as a QRF, ready to immediately launch during the expected window of enemy 
mortar activity. If a target is located, the Raven team records the activity using the digital 
video camera and provides target information via spot report. [Ref. 5]  When executed as 
described in the TTP Manual, use of the Raven SUAV for this mission has proven to be 
effective in mitigating enemy mortar fire.   
Deployed units operating the Raven SUAV to conduct Counter-Mortar QRF 
Operations execute their missions in a manner similar to what is described in the TTP 
manual.  The system is predominately at the maneuver company level and operated in 
conjunction with QRF operations.  They monitor Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) activity and 
conduct raids on insurgent strongholds and hideouts.  Raven operators typically launch 
and recover the system from building rooftops and water towers in order to maintain the 
best possible Line of Site (LOS).  Raven teams are accompanied by a Radio Transmitter 
Operator (RTO) and squad-sized security force when operating outside their Forward 
Operating Base (FOB). [Ref. 9]  
Air-Ground Teaming is a doctrinal mission found in the TTP manual and 
habitually conducted by deployed units.  When employed as a team, the Raven operator 
can identify a target, and the ground team can rapidly move to the location and make a 
clear assessment of whether or not the target is a threat. [Ref. 9]  Once identified as a 
threat, the target can be destroyed while the Raven continues executing subsequent 
missions.  This use of the Raven SUAV is popular for deployed units as it allows 
commanders to have continuous situational awareness in their area of operations.  
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Steve Schisler, Raven Integration and Customer Service 
Officer, explained in an interview conducted on 17 February 2005 that the Raven is best 
employed in conjunction with ground forces.  “If you have guys doing a mounted or 
dismounted patrol in a city or a small town, you can have the Raven flying overhead 
providing far-sight security.  The patrol can't see past the building 100 meters in front of 
them, but the Raven can.  The Raven can see beyond the building to where terrorists with 
their AK-47s are running to engage the patrol.  The Soldiers can then respond to the 
intelligence rather than respond to an attack." 
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The final doctrinal Raven SUAV mission listed in the TTP manual is Conducting 
Area Reconnaissance.  Although there are no specific instructions in the TTP manual on 
how to execute the area reconnaissance mission, units operating the system in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have established such procedures.  The Raven is incorporated into the unit’s 
mission planning and used to conduct the leader’s reconnaissance to develop target books 
for future missions.  Platoon leaders monitor handheld Remote Video Terminals (RVT) 
before entering buildings during “snatch and grab” missions, and while maneuvering 
through hostile city streets.  Raven operators have become so well acquainted with the 
area of operations that they can fly into areas without checking maps or entering 
waypoints. [Ref. 9]  The operator’s overwhelming proficiency in operating the Raven 
SUAV can be attributed to their execution of numerous area reconnaissance missions.  
Doctrinal missions written in the TTP Manual for the Raven SUAV are similarly 
executed by units operating in Afghanistan and Iraq with a few modifications.  
Commanders in the field are finding new ways to operate the system to fit the needs of 
the unit and thus further expanding the capabilities of the system.  The critical aspect of 
their creativity is getting that new doctrinal information back to those who write, update, 
and publish doctrine for the system.  This is known as the feedback loop between 
commanders in the field and doctrine writers at Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC). 
The feedback loop for the Raven SUAV remains a work-in-progress as a result of 
its newness to the Army community.  The current process for getting feedback 
information from the field varies significantly.  In some cases an Operational Assessment 
(OA) team will travel to theatre to collect information, and then report it to the 
Department of the Army and TRADOC.  On other occasions a Center or School House 
will do an independent survey either during or after a rotation by a certain unit.  Usually 
those surveys are After Action Reports conducted shortly after a unit has returned.  Those 
surveys are gathered, a report is written, and then forwarded to United States Army Test 
and Evaluation Command (ATEC), United States Army Research Laboratory (ARL), and 
Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) for recording and dissemination.  
Information is gathered from all the reports and usually sent to the Center for Army 
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Lessons Learned (CALL) for dissemination.  At the same time, Doctrine developers are 
collecting information, verifying it, and implementing it into current doctrine manuals.  
In some cases, manuals are needed and are developed through the proponent with input 
from user schools and centers.      
2. Organization 
There is a definite disparity between doctrine and practice in the Organization 
component of DOTML-PF.  According to doctrine, the Raven SUAV is to be operated 
below company level and divided among the platoons.  The requirement is for one soldier 
to operate and maintain the system while deployed in support of combat operations. Per 
doctrine, certain components of the system require higher level maintenance support.  
COLONEL John Burke, U.S. Army Project Manager, UAV Systems, stated "I now have 
something as a company commander to give me three-dimensional situational awareness; 
I never had that as an asset of my own before."  This statement drives home the point of 
where key leaders see the Raven most effectively owned, operated, and maintained. 
In practice, the Raven SUAV is owned, operated, and maintained at four different 
levels within the Army that range from brigade to platoon.  Once the sole domain of 
brigade commanders and above, the hand-launched Raven is now in the hands of platoon 
leaders and company commanders.  Commanders at each of these four levels use the 
system for varying missions and have each achieved their respective successes. Although 
there are different schools of thought concerning which level at which the Raven SUAV 
should be owned, operated; and maintained; the one common theme across the board is 
that the system is beneficial to commanders at all levels. 
3. Training 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the methodology for training on the Raven SUAV is 
not written; however, there is a solid plan established to prepare units to deploy and 
effectively operate the system.  AAI, a leading manufacturer and provider of support 
services for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, is the agency contracted to train 
U.S. Army soldiers on how to operate the Raven UAV system.  The contract provides in 
theater training for Raven systems that are to be operated by deployed U.S. Army 
soldiers.  AAI delivers a series of 10-day “school house” training courses staffed by 11 
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instructors and support personnel. [Ref. 16]  The specific aspects and phases of Raven 
SUAV training is discussed in Chapter V. 
The critical point of focus for the Training component of DOTML-PF is that the 
valuable training provided in the field by AAI should be incorporated into the feedback 
loop for lessons learned.  At some point, Non-commissioned Officers within the Army 
should become the proponent for Raven SUAV training as it will provide a substantial 
savings to the government and ultimately that individual unit.  Conducting in-house 
training will also mitigate many of the issues soldiers on the ground have encountered 
while operating the system.  In an interview with a soldier operating the Raven SUAV in 
Iraq he said, “The training I received in Kuwait was alright but it was too easy to fly there 
because of the wide open area.”  The soldier also stated that the training in Kuwait did 
not prepare him for operating the system with limited LOS and a confined launch and 
recovery site.     
The Army’s philosophy of “Train as you fight” is not conducted in totality with 
the Raven primarily because of the newness of the system.  The training issues 
discovered during the independent user assessment validates the need for more realistic 
training scenarios with an emphasis on information provided from the feedback loop.  
This will increase soldier confidence in operating the system and maximize the Raven’s 
mission success rate.    
4. Material 
The current material solution for the Army’s SUAV requirement is the Raven 
which fits closely into the Class II description for the Future Combat Systems (FCS).  
According to the Department of the Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) 
Roadmap, the Class II UAV is controlled and operated at the company level and serves to 
provide reconnaissance, security/early warning, target acquisition, and designation for the 
Infantry Company in support of enemy engagements. [Ref. 12]   Although the Raven was 
initially a Commercial Item Acquisition, the system continues to exceed key leader 





Key Leader buy-in is a critical part of a successful SUAV program.  One of the 
key ways leader buy-in is being established is by the Project Manager for Army 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Systems and the Infantry Center traveling to the Divisions 
and briefing the key leaders prior to their deployment.  The briefing given to the 
Divisional Leadership is called a New Material Introductory Brief (NMIB).  This briefing 
informs the leadership of the Raven SUAV capabilities and limitations.  It also contains 
information that the leadership needs to know about the Raven.  Some of the key areas of 
the brief are the system description, system employment, mission overview, data capture 
/ transfer, and training.  If there is no time prior to deployment to present this briefing, the 
PM office and an Infantry DCD representative will travel into theater to conduct this 
briefing.  The benefits of this briefing are remarkable so far.  The leadership is amazed 
with the capabilities that this system can provide when properly employed. Major Chris 
Brown, Kuwait Raven Equipping Detachment officer in charge stated: 
The system is developing the confidence of the leadership. We had one 
commander's team find an IED (improvised explosive device) on its first 
mission, and the commander has been sold ever since. The Raven flies 
various missions that aid in force protection.  It is flown to search for IEDs, 
provide reconnaissance for patrols and flies the perimeter of camps.   
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Steve Schisler supported Major Brown’s comment by 
adding:  
When a company or battalion can't get the larger UAV, such as the Hunter, 
Shadow, and Inet, the Raven works very well," said Chief Warrant Officer 
3 Steve Schisler, Raven integration and customer service officer.  
As the success of the Raven continues, the desire and need for it will increase.  
This asset will greatly influence the way the Army leadership at the lower levels conducts 
combat operations.  
6. Personnel 
Currently there is not a dedicated operator for the Raven.  It has been someone 
that has good hand-eye coordination and is also highly motivated.  Or in the case of the 
Special Forces teams it is whoever has a need for the Raven.  In the Infantry unit it is 
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assigned to a soldier and he employs it as the commander orders, based upon operational 
needs.  At this time there is not a particular MOS or a skills identifier attached with this 
weapon system. Major Chris Brown, Kuwait Raven Equipping Detachment officer in 
charge stated:  
The Raven is not MOS-specific, but rather the question is who can the unit 
use?  One example Brown gave was the food service specialists in Iraq 
have a smaller role because the food services are contracted to Kellogg, 
Brown, and Root. One of the best pilots in the 1st Cav. is a cook, but that 
doesn't mean we don't have scouts operating the Raven.  Some of these 
kids have been raised with Play station in their hands and are better able to 
handle watching a screen and controlling the aircraft. 
Colonel John Burke, Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System, added 
the following regarding Raven SUAV military occupational specialties:   
It's all done in theater. The only thing we do in the States is procure the 
equipment.  We ship it to a training base in Kuwait and the soldiers are 
trained right there at the training base in Kuwait with about a two week 
program of instruction. We've trained 44 different MOSs (military 
occupational specialties), from Apache pilots to cooks.  It's a very 
command-oriented system.  We give them real proficiency in how to 
operate the system but what we find is that the commanders are going to 
use that system to meet whatever mission they have. 
UAV operations were not a part of regular operations for TF 1-7 prior to 
deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.  This unit was originally trained and 
equipped as a direct support Field Artillery battalion before deployment.  The battalion 
transitioned to operating like the infantry, as a maneuver task force under the First 
Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team.  Raven operators were selected from 
within the task force and sent to Kuwait for UAV training. [Ref 13] The training they 
received was taught by other military and contractor personnel.   
One great Raven SUAV success story was with a Texas National Guard Unit.  
The unit was the 56th Brigade Combat Team, 36th Infantry Division.  They were station in 
Baghdad, Iraq, providing security prior to the first elections in March 2005.  They were 
the first unit in the Texas Army National Guard to acquire and field the SUAV in a 
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combat mission.  The Air Force requested them to fly the Raven over the air base to look 
for possible threats that might be in the area. 
Prior to coming to Iraq, most of these Infantry soldiers never heard of a SUAV or 
what the acronym stood for.  The soldiers were given their first mission to conduct 
reconnaissance within their area of operation.  Until now, most of the soldiers to include 
the high ranking leadership within the organization, doubted the benefits of using the 
Raven SUAV.   Some of the soldiers referred to SUAV as a toy and a model Airplane.  
This aircraft is far from being a toy because the job it performs is just as deadly as the 
attack helicopters that fly in the airspace of Iraq and because the information that it 
collects can tell ground troops where the enemy or threat is located. [Ref 14].   Soldiers 
have learned that the Raven can be used to perform other missions as well.  They also use 
it for force protection, route reconnaissance, target acquisition, and battle damage 
assessment.  
A Sergeant in the aforementioned unit stated that the SUAV is an invaluable 
intelligence-gathering tool and that the real-time imagery the Raven provides is 
invaluable. He stated, “By employing the Raven with these units, fewer Soldiers are put 
at risk in doing the observation job that the Raven is capable of doing for them and is 
definitely a life saver.” [Ref. 14].  The operators of the Raven SUAV in the case of the 
Texas National Guard are actual Intelligence analysts.  In most cases within the Army, 
the operator is the Infantry soldier on the ground.   When this is the case, the Infantry 
Soldier is no longer a shooter.      
7. Facilities 
There are no real facilities involved with the requirements generation, 
maintenance, training, or support for the Raven SUAV.  The only facilities that are 
involved are where the system is manufactured in southern California.  Since the Raven 
is a hand-launched UAV, there is no requirement for an airfield.  Figure 6 shows a soldier 
hand-launching the Raven SUAV for an undisclosed mission.  His unit is employing the 
Raven in a three-soldier team.  This enables for the Raven to be set up and ready to 




Figure 6.   Raven SUAV Hand Launch [Ref 15] 
 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a discussion and analysis of how the Raven Small UAV 
(SUAV) is supposed to be operated and maintained according to “doctrine,” as compared 
to how the system is operated and maintained in “practice.”  The Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTML-PF) model is the framework that was used to conduct the comparison 
and provide in-depth analysis for each DOTML-PF component.   
The brief review of Chapter IV and V was provided in order to provide the reader 
a clear understanding on the intent of this chapter.  The focus then shifted to comparing 
and contrasting those two chapters to form a conclusion and recommendations which will 
be provided in Chapter VII.   
The two primary issues addressed in this chapter were The Feedback Loop and 
the best way to gain leader buy-in for the use of the Raven SUAV.   These two issues 
play a leading role in the overall success of the Raven.  Without either one of these key 
elements, the system will not be a success.  The Feedback Loop is critical in gaining 
information from the field and establishing doctrine based upon the lessons 
learned.  Without a solid Feedback Loop, soldiers will have to start from scratch each 
time they employ the system, wasting valuable time to relearn the system’s capabilities.   
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Key leader buy-in is gradually occurring with each successful mission flown by 
the Raven.  The PM office, in conjunction with the Infantry Center, has coordinated with 
the Units in Iraq and in CONUS to give them the NMIB.   This briefing is the first step in 
establishing key leader buy-in and support.  The briefings are going well and the 
leadership is seriously interested in exploiting the value that the Raven brings to 
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VII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter examines the primary and subsidiary research questions.  
Conclusions and recommendations are presented as well as recommendations for further 
research. 
 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Are there differences between doctrine and practice with regard to Raven SUAV 
operations?   
Overall, doctrine and practice differ for Raven SUAV operations.  The primary 
cause is that Raven was initially acquired as a commercial item with minimal written 
doctrine accompanying it. Since its acquisition, Raven has evolved into the Army’s 
SUAV of choice and doctrine continues to improve as units find new and innovative 
ways to employ the system.   
Using the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTML-PF) as our framework for 
comparing doctrine to practice, we discovered that Doctrine, Organization, and Training 
were the components in which differences exist.  Based upon our analysis it is our 
conclusion that although differences exist between doctrine and practice, there are none 
that are mission-threatening.  In fact, commanders have found ways to use the system that 
have saved numerous lives. The critical issue however is how these uses are incorporated 
into future doctrine.  This portion of the primary research question is answered by the 
responses to subsidiary questions one and two.  The conclusions to these research 







B. FIRST SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
Is there an efficient and effective feedback loop for Raven SUAV lessons 
learned? 
1.  Conclusion 
There is no standard feedback loop established for incorporating Raven SUAV 
lessons learned from the field into doctrine. The current process for getting feedback 
information from the field varies and spans two different methodologies.  The first and 
most popular method consists of an Operational Assessment (OA) team collecting data 
observed while in theater.  The OA team also conducts interviews with key leaders and 
Raven operators to ensure that what is observed is cross-checked with input and feedback 
from unit personnel.  The information is then reported to the Department of the Army and 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 
The second method for incorporating Raven SUAV lessons learned in the field 
into doctrine consists of a Center or School House representative conducting an 
independent survey, either during or after a specific unit rotation. In most cases, these 
surveys are After Action Reports conducted shortly after a unit has returned.  Surveys are 
gathered, a report is written, and then forwarded for recording and dissemination.  
There have been no reports concerning which methodology is more effective 
however information and lessons learned from units operating the system are properly 
written into doctrinal manuals for the Raven SUAV.  Although not standard, both of 
these methodologies can serve as interim feedback mechanisms Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) are established.  
  
2.  Recommendations 
Decision makers should establish one standard mechanism for reporting Raven 
SUAV lessons learned for incorporation into evolving doctrine.  Many success stories 
have been told about Raven and how it is saving lives on the battlefield. How these units 
employ the system is perishable feedback data that must be effectively and efficiently 
synthesized and disseminated.  Units should not wait until redeployment to disseminate 
Raven SUAV lessons learned, but rather do so as soon as they discover new and 
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innovative ways that preserve life and increase combat effectiveness.  Figure 7 depicts 












Figure 7.   Recommended Raven SUAV Feedback Loop [Ref. 16] 
 
 
C. SECOND SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
Are “real-world” lessons learned systematically incorporated into Raven SUAV 
doctrine? 
1.  Conclusion 
The Raven SUAV is a new and unique system which has been available to the 
warfighters only since mid 2003.  Small UAVs have been flown by the Marine Corps as 
well as the Army Special Operation Forces, but there is no systemic documentation of the 
“real world” lessons learned.   
Since the Raven is a new system and falls under the Rapid Equipping/Fielding in 
support of OIF and Operations in Afghanistan, everything that is done is experimental 
and “learn as you go.” The lessons learned from operations in Iraq are documented and 
are help develop doctrine and procedures for future forces. The Infantry Directorate of 
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Combat Development (DCD) is closely monitoring how the various units in Iraq are best 
employing the system.  They are then able to document the best procedures and practices.  
encompassassing many ways to employ the Raven.    
The Infantry Center DCD is providing excellent documentation about how the 
Raven is employed.  The subject matter experts at the Infantry Center are Mr. Reggie 
Poissant and Major Matt England.  They have traveled to Iraq to ensure that employment 
are being employed are being recorded and included in appropriate documents.  These 
same individuals will also be on the Integrated Product Teams (IPT) that will develop 
SUAV requirements in the future.  They will take the lessons learned and put them to use 
in developing future requirements and TTPs. 
 
2.  Recommendations 
The Infantry Center DCD is doing an excellent job gathering information from the 
field.  They should continue gathering this information from soldiers in deployed and 
returning units. This information should be systematically documented and sent to the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).  The CALL has a classified website that is 
used extensively for discussing current TTPs for both Blue and Red forces.  Commanders 
in the field will be alerted to go to the CALL website to get relevant and current 
information that's relevant and up-to-date.  Due to the CALL being at Ft. Leavenworth, 
the Combined Arms Center and Combined Arms Directorate can ensure they stay in the 
loop. The Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) system, developed by the 
Infantry Center DCD was put on the CALL website.  Commanders were sent an email to 
download it, and now all SUAV users in Iraq can use the guide to help deconflict 








D. THIRD SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
How is PM-UAV/Army achieving leader buy-in for the Raven SUAV?   
1.  Conclusion 
Leader acceptance of the Raven SUAV was recognized early by the Project 
Manager‘s office as being one of the most important issues for system success. Since it is 
not a fully funded Army program and the requirements came from the commanders in the 
field, the PM concluded that buy-in was therefore significant. Some commanders 
immediately used the Raven to its full potential. Others saw it as a hindrance which took 
away from their ground combat power, seeing Raven as more like a toy than a combat 
multiplier.  As lessons learned from Raven success came out of the field and were 
analyzed by the PM and the Infantry Center DCD, new TTPs were developed.  Due to the 
lack of buy-in by various commanders at all levels; a briefing was designed solely for 
educating leadership on the benefits of using the Raven.   This initiative has been a great 
success, and leadership gradually grasps Raven capabilities.    
2. Recommendation 
The PM office should continue doing what they are doing.  Having proactive 
Product Managers is crucial to the success of this system.   They are able to observe and 
educate the leadership about the significance of Raven. They must also include staff 
members from all levels within the organization.  In doing so, the leadership must 
emphasize the importance of the Raven and how it should be employed based upon 
current TTPs. The PM office must gain input from senior leaders, action officers, 
commanders, and soldiers concerning the functionality of the Raven.  Since the Raven 
impacts all aspects of unit missions and there currently is not a dedicated system 
operator, more than one person needs to be able to effectively operate and maintain the 
system.  
Securing leader buy-in is not an easy task. With each successful mission 
leadership gains trust in Raven capabilities. As Mark Walton states in his book 
Generating Buy-In, there is a step-by step-process that must be used in order to get 
leadership, organizations, and soldiers to accept new systems or practices.  Walton also 
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states that, “Generating buy-in is an indispensable resource for leading and succeeding in 
today’s fiercely competitive world.”  
 
E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1.  Conduct an analysis to determine why the Army chose to acquire the 
Raven versus the Dragon Eye which was already in use by the Marine Corps. 
2. Conduct an analysis to determine if the Raven SUAV can or will evolve 
into the Future Combat Systems (FCS) SUAV of choice. 
3. Conduct research to determine if the author’s recommended feedback 




APPENDIX A. TRIP REPORTS 
A. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 
NPS          10 Jan 2005 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
 
SUBJECT:  TRIP REPORT –UAV Conference, Las Vegas, NV, 8-9 November 2004  
 
PURPOSE:  To document results of thesis research findings while attending the UAV Conference in Las Vegas, 




1.   This conference focused upon the UAV technologies that are being developed and fielded as a response to 
DoD’s transformational goal for integrating unmanned aircraft into the current and future warfighting force.  The 
DoD’s demand for UAVs has never been greater as billions of dollars continue to pour into UAV research, 
development, testing, and training.  UAVs have continued to exceed expectations as a front-line ISR aircraft in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and will soon take on other attack missions deemed too dangerous for human undertaking.  As a critical 
component in network-centric warfare, emerging UAV payload opportunities should magnify their roles and 
responsibilities tenfold.  The development of new UAV technologies to support future missions and initiatives leaves 
the door wide open for industry to solve daunting technical challenges and capitalize upon a vast new array of 
developmental opportunities.  The conference looked at what role various organizations will play. 
 The conference was sponsored by The American Institute of Engineers (AIE), the National Military 
Intelligence Association (NMIA), and the Association of Naval Aviation (ANA). The agenda examined the broad range 
of UAV platforms, missions, and payload opportunities.  Some of the questions that were addressed were: 
 What is the OSD master plan for UAVs? 
 What are the Services’ roadmaps for UAVs? 
 What is the status and likely future direction for the Global Hawk, Predator, X-45, X-47,  Fire Scout, and 
numerous other UAV platforms?  
 Where are the Service challenges, needs, and initiatives in arming UAVs?  
 Where are the payload opportunities associated with Global Hawk, Predator,  Shadow, UCAR, and other 
major platforms? 
2.   This was a very beneficial trip.  This was our initial meeting with our sponsor, COL John Burke, the Project 
Manager for the Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) UAV program.  He gave us his input and assisted 
us in narrowing the scope of our thesis.  We came out of the meeting with an initial rescoped question of “Is it feasible 
to have UAVs below battalion level.”  This was the question we went with and then narrowed the topic from there to 
come up with current Thesis Question.  There were many representatives from Government and Industry attending this 
conference.  This enabled us to make contact with Chris Hernandez, Vice President, Northrop Grumman, and arrange a 
meeting with them at a later date. 





































B. SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 
 
NPS          28 Jan 2005 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
 
SUBJECT: TRIP REPORT – Thesis Research Travel to San Diego (13-14 Jan 2005).  
 
PURPOSE:  To document results of thesis research findings and results while attending meetings with Sparta Inc. 




1.  Our meeting with at Sparta Inc. convened on 14 January 2005 at 0900.  The purpose of the meeting was to  
identify current and emerging Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) developments and technologies to support units 
below the battalion level.  The facilitator of this meeting was Mr. Sonny Haskins, Director, UAV Projects, SPARTA, 
Inc.  
 
2.  Mr. Haskins started the meeting by providing us with an overview of Sparta’s mission, role, and objectives  
with regard to developing technologies and explained that the meeting would remain unclassified.  With this 
background, we discussed the history of the small UAV system as well as other tasks that SPARTA performed to 
support the warfighter.   
 
3.  Mr. Haskins then provided us with a thorough briefing on Sparta’s role in the development of the Raven  
UAV which is currently being extensively used in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Sparta is responsible for producing the wings, 
the centerpiece, and the nose cone for the system.  The only portion of the Raven system that Sparta does not produce is 
the fuselage. Further discussion focused on Raven supportability and maintainability.  
 
4.  Mr. Haskins then provided us with an extensive tour of the Sparta facilities to include the administrative and  
operations sections.  We had the awesome opportunity to see first-hand how the parts for the Raven were made as well 
as other projects the company is responsible for producing.  The tour of the facilities allowed us to see a real-world 
production line. This helped us fully understand what we learned in the classroom environment just one quarter ago. 
 
5.  Mr. Haskins concluded the meeting by answering specific questions we had regarding the Raven system.   
Our meeting with Sparta Inc. adjourned at 1200 hrs.3. Our afternoon meeting was with Northrop Grumman were we 
met with Mr. Chris Hernandez and his staff. This meeting was set up during our trip to Las Vega after we requested a 
copy of Mr. Hernandez’s briefing slides and notes.  Mr. Hernandez’s staff briefed several of their current programs but 
did not give us much information beneficial to our thesis; however it was a good opportunity to see their facility and 
how they conduct business.  Members of the Northup Grumman staff asked us questions regarding current Army 
requirements and the Army UAV Way-ahead document. We informed them that we were not aware of current 
requirements and the Army Way ahead.  We reiterated that we were students and did not represent the Army UAV 
Program Office. The meeting adjourned at 1600. 
 











































C. SAVANNAH, GEORGIA 
NPS          06 Feb 2005 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
 
SUBJECT:  TRIP REPORT –UAV Fielding and Sustainment Integrated Project Team (FSIPT)   Savannah GA, 31 Jan 
- 4 Feb 2005  
 





1.  This conference focused on UAV sustainment and fielding within the Army.  The first day consisted of 
briefings regarding was taking place in theater and the fielding process for the Army UAV systems.  This focused 
primarily upon the big picture.  The attendees consisted of people from the Project Office, the Infantry Center 
Directorate of Combat Development (DCD), the TRADOC System Manager (TSM), the contractors that support the 
various systems, and the user representatives from the units. 
 
2. COL Burke had opening remarks and began his briefing by asking the audience “What is a Project 
Manager”?  He explained the roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager (PM) and where he fits into the big 
picture of the Army UAV Acquisition Strategy.  He did not focus primarily upon one particular UAV System, but 
looked at the future of UAVs. 
 
3. On day two and three, the IPT broke out into Splinter Groups.  We were part of the Small UAV/Raven group 
which was headed by the Assistant PM for UAVs, LTC Andy Ramsey.  Other members in the group were from Army 
Headquarters G8, Army Headquarters G3 User Representative from the ground units in the field, TSM Representative, 
DCD Representative from the Infantry Center, and a representative from Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.  
 
4. We spent a majority of our time working with Reggie Poissant.  Reggie is the representative from the Ft 
Benning DCD and wrote the SUAV Capabilities Development Document (CDD).  He directly interacts with the users 
and spent 30 days in Iraq working closely with the units that were employing the Small UAV Raven System.  He has 
developed the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), the System Training Plan (STRAP), and the Operational 
Mode Summary Mission Profile (OMS-MP).  We will continue to work with Reggie Poissant throughout the research 
for this project.  
 















































D. WASHINGTON, D.C  
NPS          14 March 2005 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
 
SUBJECT:  Trip Report–Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Conference, Washington D.C.,  
06-09 March 2005  
 




1. This conference featured top experts from the United States Congress, Northrop Grumman, General Atomics, 
Lockheed Martin, and several other agencies to examine the latest UAV opportunities from a congressional, military 
and industry perspective.  The most important feature of the conference from a research standpoint was the UAV 
system updates for the Raven, Predator, Global Hawk, Fire Scout, and the Micro UAVs.  These updates provided 
critical insight on current system usage, capabilities, and future system improvements and upgrades.  This conference 
was sponsored by The American Institute of Engineers (AIE), in conjunction with The National Military Intelligence 
Association (NMIA) and the Association of Naval Aviation (ANA). 
 
2. Congressman Jerry Lewis was the opening speaker at the conference.  He explained his interest in the future 
of Unmanned Vehicles after highlighting its current usage and net worth to war-fighters on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  More importantly, Congressman Lewis pledged to be an avid supporter of future UAV Research 
and Development to ensure adequate funding at all stages of the Acquisition Lifecycle.    
 
3. Colonel John Burke, PM UAV-Army, provided an extensive UAV Systems program update encompassing 
all classes of UAVs.   
4. Mr. John Grabowsky, President and General Manager of AeroVironment SUAV Products Division, provided 
an outstanding briefing themed “Back to Iraq:  Raven, Dragon Eye, & Pointer UAVs.”  His briefing highlighted the 
swift fielding and many accomplishments of the Raven, Dragon Eye and Pointer UAVs.  He noted that AeroVironment 
delivered the first Raven SUAV to theater within 20 weeks after contract award.  Mr. Grabowsky’s other points of 
discussion during his presentation were the Raven’s logistics flow, its various missions and mission success stories.  
Mr. Grabowsky’s presentation was relevant and provided valuable information for our project research. 
5. We also met with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  Dr. Brad Tousley, Program 
Manager for the Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), provided 
extensive details about his program goals and objectives.  The primary goal of the Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program is to further develop and integrate MAV technologies into 
militarily-useful and affordable back-packable systems suitable for dismounted soldier, Marine, and Special Forces 
missions.  
6. Point of contact is MAJ Glenn Jenkins at gejenkin@nps.edu. 
 







































LIST OF REFERENCES                                        
1.  DARPA, Micro Air Vehicle Briefing. Washington, D.C., 2005. 
 
2. AeroVironment, Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator’s Manual 
Version 2.1., October 2003.  
 
3. Infantry Center Directorate of Combat Development, 3rd Brigade Combat Team 
Briefing, 2004. 
 
4. Telephone Conversation between Mr. Reggie Poissant, Infantry Center 
Directorate of Combat Development, and MAJ William Snodgrass, Jan 25, 2005. 
 
5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Project Management Office, Draft Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). Huntsville, Alabama, Jun 26.  
 
6. UAV Rolling News available: <http://www.uavworld.com/_disc1/000000f9.htm> 
Jan. 8 2004. 
 
7. SAIC Test Evaluation and Analysis Operation Webpage available: 
<www.teao.saic.com> Mar. 20, 2005. 
 
8. Sparta, Inc.,  New & Updated Final UAV London TTC – UAV Platforms 
Briefing,  San Diego, CA 2005. 
 
9. Infantry Center Directorate of Combat Development, Iraqi Trip Report, Nov 29, 
2004. 
 
10. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Adoption of the United 
Stated Special Operations Common Rucksack Portable Unmanned Aerial 
(RPUAV) Operational Requirements Document Memorandum, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia Dec 3, 2004. 
 
11. Defense Aerospace Webpage available: <http://www.defense-aerospace.com>, 
Feb 10, 2005. 
 
12. Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap. Webpage, 
available:  <http://www.acq.osd.mil/usd/uav_roadmap.pdf> Dec 2002.  
 
13. 1st Infantry Division Webpage, available: <www.1id.army.mil> Feb 15, 2005. 
 
14. Mateo, Master Sgt. Lek, Raven SUAV Gaining Altitude with Texas Soldiers.   
 Webpage, The National Guard, available: 
  <http://www.ngb.army.mil/news/story.asp?id=1494> Mar 22, 2005. 
 56
15. Defend America Webpage, available: 
        <http://www.defendamerica.mil/photoessays/oct2004/p101904b4.html> Apr 15,  
 2005. 
 
16. MAJ Glenn Jenkins, MAJ William Snodgrass, Feedback Loop Diagram, Created 
May 2005. 
 57
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
17. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
18. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
19. Professor David F. Matthews, Colonel (Ret) 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
20. Professor Raymond C. Franck, BG (Ret) 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
21. MAJ Glenn E. Jenkins 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
22. MAJ William Snodgrass 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
